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J,EGAL TSSUES: SAN FRANCTSCO RAY, SACRAMENTO-
.SAN JnAourN RIVER DELTA AND ESTUARY
I. Tntrodurtion
The development of the Water Quality Control Plan in the
Phase I proceedings related to the San Francisco Bay,
Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta and Estuary is a complex
matter, from both a factual and legal perspective. This paper
contains a discussion of the controlling legal principles.
II. The Role of the Distrirt Conrt Derision
In undertaking the development of a Water Quality Control
Plan for the San Francisco Bay and Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta and associated estuary (hereinafter "Bay-Delta"), the
State Water Resources Control Board (hereinafter "Board" or
"SWRCB") must follow strictly the governing guidelines
established by the District Court in Unitert States v. State 
Water Resources Control Board  asupra, 182 Cal.App.3d 82. In
that opinion the Court reviewed D-1485, as well as the "Water
Quality Control Plan, Sacramento-San Joaquin River and Suisun
Marsh" (hereinafter referred to as the "D-1485 Plan"), and found
that the Board had "failed to carry out properly its water
quality planning obligations." (182 Cal.App.3d, supra, at
p. 120.) The Court, however, declined to remand D-1485 to the
Board since it was aware that the Board intended to conduct
hearings to establish new and revised objectives in the near
future. The Court admonished that the Board follow the dictates
of the Court's decision in the new hearings. The Court stated:
"[W]e would expect the renewed proceedings to be conducted in
light of the principles and views expressed in this opinion."
(182 Cal.App.3d, supra, at p. 120.)
Three of the basic legal principles dealt with in
are derived from the Congress' and the Legislature's mandates
with respect to the protection of water quality, and are
particularly important. While consideration of these factors
will undoubtedly make the Board's evaluation more difficult,
their consideration is essential for a legally proper and
defensible water quality control plan.
First, in the development of the revised water quality
control plan, the Board must look at and consider all factors
which contribute to water quality, including both point and non-
point sources of pollution. Second, the Board's duty is not to
establish water quality objectives at the highest level of
protection; rather, the Board must formulate objectives which
are reasonable, considering all demands being made and to be
made on those waters and the total values involved. Third,
water rights and legal concepts associated with water rights
have nothing to do with the development of the water quality
control plan. Consideration of water rights and associated
concepts, in developing the water quality control plan, is
impermissible.
Each of these factors is discussed in more detail below.
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A.	 The Board Must Look at and Consider All Factors Which
Affect water Quality, with the Control of Point Source
Discharges of Pollutants the Primary Target of Board
Conc n
As noted in the District Court's decision, the area of
water quality regulation and control is dominated by federal
legislation that either preempts state regulation or, when it
allows for state regulation, requires that it be at least as
stringent as that which exists in the federal acts. (33 U.S.C.
§ 1370.) The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (hereinafter
"FWPCA"), (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376), was originally enacted in
1948. This initial enactment generally deferred to the states
with respect to the control of water quality. In 1972, however,
the FWPCA was substantially amended. The amendments recognized
that the legislation's prior approach of state primacy had, for
various reasons, proven ineffective. Congress instead adopted a
nationwide approach focused upon the elimination of pollutants.
Water quality control mandated under the FWPCA includes two
areas of control: (1) the achievement of effluent limitations
on point sources of pollution, and (2) the achievement of
acceptable water quality standards. The term "effluent
limitation" means "any restriction established by a State ... on
quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical,
biological, and other constituents which are discharged from
point sources into navigable waters ...." (33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(11).) The term "point sources" means "any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance ... from which pollutants are
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or may be discharged. This term does not include return flows
from irrigated agriculture." (33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).)
Effluent limitations on point sources that do not provide
"protection of public water supplies, agricultural and
industrial uses, and the protection and propagation of a
balanced population of shellfish, fish and wildlife, and allow
recreation activities in and on the water" affected must be
reasonably modified to allow for maintenance of water quality
for these purposes.	 (33 U.S.C.	 1312(a).)
The discharge of pollutants into a navigable body of water
from a point source is restricted. The requirement of National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (hereinafter "NPDES")
permits for discharges is a means of achieving and enforcing
effluent limitations in receiving waters. 1 (33 U.S.C. 9 1342.)
The NPDES obligates point source discharges of pollutants to
meet applicable effluent limitations. It is unlawful under the
FWPCA to discharge pollutants over an established effluent
limitation.	 (33 U.S.C. 9 1319.) As noted above, effluent
limitations are to be established to protect the water
resources.	 (33 U.S.C. § 1312(a).) This obligation is separate
The FWPCA provides that "(t]he Administrator shall not require a
permit under this section for discharges composed entirely of return flows
from irrigated agriculture, nor shall the Administration directly or
indirectly, require any State to require such a permit. (33 U.S.C.
1342(1); 222, 33 u.s.c. 9 1362(14) (the term "point source" does not
include return flows from irrigated agriculture).) The FWPCA, however,
allows state regulation to be more stringent than regulation under federal
law. (33 u.s.c. 9 1370.) The State of California, of course, in certain
instances regulates agricultural return flows as well as non-point sources
of pollution	 (aee 23 Cal. Admin. Code §§ 2205 et seq.)
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es"	
from the obligation to meet "standards" that apply to
"pollutants" generally. (Id.)
Thus, in relevant part, the 1972 amendments focused upon
the prohibition of any discharge of pollutants from a point
source without first obtaining, and complying with, a permit
issued by the relevant entity. In this case the entity charged
with the regulation of pollutant discharges is the State of
California.	 (See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342; 182 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 107-108; 8_e_e  also LEA v. State Water gesources Control Board
(1976) 426 U.S. 200, 204-208.) This absolute prohibition on the
discharge of pollutants from point sources without permit, and
the relevant state regulation in this field, are important
elements in the Board's current inquiry. Indeed, given the
federal mandates, the Board must start its inquiry with respect
to the protection of beneficial uses here, before it proceeds to
investigate other areas of pollution.
In addition to the effluent limitation aspects of water
quality control, the states also have responsibilities with
respect to pollutants in water that are not associated with
discharges from point sources. 	 (33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C),
1313.) The goal here is to identify water in which control of
pollutant discharges from point sources is alone inadequate to
meet water quality standards. The standards themselves are
retained as a ,supplement to the point source discharge
limitations.	 (33 U.S.C. § 1313; see 182 Cal.App.3d 108.)	 It	 is
this latter inquiry, and the need to supplement the protections
afforded through discharge limitation, which allows the Board to
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examine the question of salinity control. While saltwater
intrusion clearly is a "pollutant" (33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(b) (2) (1),
1314(f) (E)), "[t]he intrusion of salt water is neither a
discharge from a point source nor a discharge of a pollutant."
(182 Cal.App.3d at p. 108; see U.S. ex Lai. Im v. Tenn. Water 
Quality Control Bd. (6th Cir. 1983) 717 F.2d 992, cert Idea., 446
U.S. 937; State 2,1 ma. aA Lai Ashcroft V. Dept. 2,1 the Army 
(8th Cir. 1982) 672 F.2d 1297, 1304; National Wild/jig v.
Gorsuch (D.C. Cir. 1982) 693 F.2d 156.)
B.	 The Formulation of "Reasonable" Standards 
As noted in Racanelli, the control of salinity (which is
only one aspect of the Water Quality Control Plan) is not part
of the permitting system. Rather, salinity is dealt with
generally within the requirement that the states engage in "a
continuing planning process" and identify those waters within
its boundaries for which the discharge restrictions (discussed
above) are inadequate to achieve the water quality standards.
In this context, the federal act requires that the states
formulate water quality standards, through a basin planning
process, to provide for protection from non-point sources of
pollution, including all man-induced or man-made alterations of
the chemical, physical, biological and radiological integrity of
water. (33 U.S.C. §§ 1281, 1288.) Included in this area is the
control of saltwater intrusion. (182 Cal.App.3d, suprR, at
pp. 108-109.)
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The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as "P-CWQCA), Water Code sections 13000 et
seq. is the State of California's statutory framework for
controlling water quality. The Act contemplates a joint effort
between the local Regional Water Quality Control Boards and the
SWRCB. Formulation of water quality control plans for specific
regions in the State is a primary function of the Regional
Boards. These plans form the basis of the water quality
objectives of the State. While the Regional Boards have been
delegated authority to formulate and adopt plans for all areas
within their respective regions, these plans do not become
effective until approved by the SWRCB. (Wat. Code §§ 13240,
13245.) The SWRCB may adopt plans which amend or supersede any
regional water quality control plan. (Wat. Code § 13170; See 
182 Cal.App.3d, supra, at p. 109.)
The Board, in developing the instant Water Quality Control
Plan, must confine its analysis within certain statutory
mandates. The Water Code is specific in its definition of a
water quality control plan:
"'Water quality control plan' consists of a
designation or establishment for the waters within a
specified area of (1) beneficial uses to be protected,
(2) water quality objectives, and (3) a program of
implementation needed for achieving water quality
objectives." (Wat. Code 	 13050(j); aee 182
Cal.App.3d, supra, at p. 119.)
The term "beneficial uses" is defined to include, but is not
limited to:
"[D]omestic, municipal, agricultural and industrial
supply; power generation; recreation; aesthetic
-7-
enjoyment; navigation; and preservation and
enhancement of fish, wildlife, and other aquatic
resources or preserves." (Nat. Code § 13050(f).)
The term "water quality objectives" means:
"[T]he limits or levels of water quality constituents
or characteristics which are established for the
reasonable protection of beneficial uses of water or
the prevention of nuisance within a specific area."
(Nat. Code	 13050(h).)
And the elements of the program of implementation are also
spelled out clearly in the Code:
"The program of implementation for achieving water
quality objectives shall include, but not be limited
to:
"(a) A description of the nature of actions
which are necessary to achieve the objectives,
including recommendations for appropriate action by
any entity, public or private.
"(b) A time schedule for the actions to be
taken.
"(c) A description of surveillance to be
undertaken to determine compliance with objectives."
(Nat. Code § 13242; aae 182 Cal.App.3d, supra, at
p. 119.)
A key teaching in the District Court's decision is that the
objectives that are to be established by the Board must be
"reasonable." The term "reasonable," although not defined
within the Act, is referred to throughout the P-CWQCA and in the
Racanelli decision.2
The Legislature, in its policy statement regarding the need
to protect the quality of the water resource, found that:
2	 As will be discussed below, the term "reasonable" may have a
different definition than that provided by water rights case law. The
determination of reasonableness, in the water quality context, may require
the application of certain specified factors, found in the P-CWOCA, to the
factual situation presented in the planning process.
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"[A]ctivities and factors which may affect the quality
of the waters of the state shall be regulated to
attain the highest water quality which is reasonable. 
considering all demands being made and to he made on
those waters and the total values involved, beneficial
and detrimental, economic and social, tangible and
intangible." (Emphasis added.)	 (Wat. Code § 13000;
see 182 Cal.App.3d, supr4, at p. 109.)
This is very similar to Congress' direction to the states that
when they adopt new water quality standards, 3 those standards
shall be established taking into consideration their use and
value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and
wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial
and other purposes, and also their use and value for navigation.
(33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2); aaa 182 Cal.App.3d, suprd, at p. 120.)
Thus, while the Board is charged with the establishment of
water quality objectives for the Bay-Delta, those objectives are
not to be set without regard to the impact such objectives would
have on other uses of water. Rather, the Legislature and
Congress have limited the authority to establish objectives at
"the highest quality which is reasonable, considering all
demands being made and to be made on those waters and the total
values involved." (Wat. Code § 13000; emphasis added.)
Racane lli referred to this crucial aspect of the Board's
authority at several points, at one time referring to the
Board's need to take a "global perspective" in fulfilling its
3	 The FWPCA speaks in terms of the establishment of "standards" while
the P-CWQCA utilizes the term "objectives." These terms are legally
synonymous for the purpose of the Board's actions. The term "objectives"
is used herein when referring to the Board's P-CWQCA obligations.
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water quality planning obligations. (182 Cal.App.3d, „supra., at
p. 119.)
This requirement is consistent with the enunciated state
water quality control policy, which requires that water quality
principles and guidelines be "consistent with the state goal of
providing a decent home and suitable living environment for
every Californian." (Wat. Code § 13142.) "Every Californian"
includes, of course, those living outside of the area covered by
the Bay-Delta objectives. Moreover, in establishing standards,
the Board must consider "the effect of its actions ... on the
California Water Plan [Wat. Code §§ 10004 at seq.] ... and on
any other general or coordinated governmental plan looking
toward the development, utilization or conservation of the
waters of the state." (Wat. Code 5. 13145; emphasis added.)
Finally, the Legislature specifically recognized that in
establishing water quality objectives, it was possible for the
quality of water to be changed to some degree "without
unreasonably affecting beneficial uses." (Wat. Code § 13241.)
The Legislature, therefore, enumerated certain factors that must
be considered by the Board in determining what reasonable
protections should be. These factors are:
"(a) Past, present, and probable future
beneficial uses of water.
"(b) Environmental characteristics of the
hydrographic unit under consideration, including the
quality of water available thereto.
"(c) Water quality conditions that could
reasonably be achieved through the coordinated control
of all factors which affect water quality in the area.
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"(d) Economic considerations.
"(e) The need for developing housing within the
region." (Wat. Code § 13241.)
C. Watex_Bishta_liame_S_Bala_in_Eatet_Oialisa_Elanatag.
In some respects, the most significant conclusion in the
Raranelli decision is that the Board's water rights functions
have no role in the water quality planning process. The Board's
function in developing a water quality plan is to protect
beneficial uses, not water rights. (182 Cal.App.3d, auRLa, at
pp. 117-118.) Indeed, "enforcing rights of water rights holders
[is] a task mainly left to the courts." (Id. at p. 104;
emphasis in original.) The water quality and water rights
functions are separate and have no necessary relationship, one
to the other. The Court stated:
"We think the procedure followed - combining the water
quality and water rights functions in a single
proceeding - was unwise. The Legislature issued no
mandate that the combined functions be performed in a
single proceeding." (182 Cal.App.3d, supra, at
p. 119.)
This determination is crucial in two respects. First, as
the Court noted, a water quality planning process analysis
focused upon the protection of water rights is fundamentally
defective. (182 Cal.App.3d, supra, at p. 116.) The goal is to
protect beneficial uses, not water rights. Second, a water
quality planning process which limits its analysis to specific
water rights (the two water projects) is too narrow. The water
quality planning process must look to all possible impacts on
water quality including, in this case, "upstream diverters or
polluters." (182 Cal.App.3d, supra, at p. 118.) The Board's
water quality obligations are much broader than its water rights
obligations, both in purpose and scope. (Ipi. at p. 122.)
Conceptually, the separation of beneficial uses from water
rights may be the most difficult aspect of the Racanelli 
decision to grasp. Nonetheless, it is essential that the Board
understand the concept, not only as it applies to beneficial
instream use (not normally associated with a water right) but
also as it applies to consumptive uses (which are associated
with water rights). As the Court noted and the applicable
statutory language appears to support, the Legislature has
ripped the concept of "beneficial uses" from its water rights
origin, allowing it to stand on its own. That is, the
Legislature has mandated the reasonable protection of beneficial
uses of water, and the terms "reasonable" and "beneficial" have
different meanings in the water quality planning process than
they do in the water rights context. Obviously they cannot have
totally different meanings, but there are subtle differences,
related to the context in which are used, that should be noted.
First, as noted above, the P-CWQCA itself defines the
"beneficial uses" that are to be protected in the development of
the plan. These uses include, but are not limited to, domestic,
municipal, agricultural and industrial uses of water; use of
water for power generation and navigation; the use of water for
recreation, aesthetic enjoyment, fish, wildlife and associated
uses.
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Second, while the term "reasonable" is not defined in the
Act, it is used numerous times, and the Legislature has provided
numerous examples of how the Board is to determine and then
balance the reasonableness of any set of water quality
objectives. This last point is important. In the water rights
context, reasonableness is viewed from the perspective of the
use of the water right, i.e., a determination of whether a Use
of water is reasonable in light of competing uses of water. In
the water quality context, the question is whether the objective 
is reasonable, given the competing uses of water. These two
inquiries are not the same.
The types of things that the Board must look at in
determining whether a given objective is reasonable differ from
the water rights context. In a water rights analysis, one looks
at the reasonableness of a particular water right vis-a-vis 
other specific water rights. In the water quality context one
looks at the reasonableness of an objective, in a "global"
manner. One must look at the impact of a water quality
objective on "all demands being made and to be made on those
waters and the total values involved, beneficial and
detrimental, economic and social, tangible and intangible."
(Wat. Code	 13000; emphasis added.) The objectives must be
reasonable from a state-wide perspective (Wat. Code 	 13142),
taking into consideration the California Water Plan (Wat. Code
§ 13145).
In this context, the P-CWQCA recognizes that water quality
can be changed without unreasonably affecting a beneficial use.
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In other words, it is reasonable in establishing a water quality
objective to affect a beneficial use if doing so takes into
account and preserves the ability to provide water for other
beneficial uses of water. (Nat. Code § 13241.)
D.	 Summary of Analysis 
The foregoing analysis is perhaps best understood by way of
an example. In developing its Water Quality Control Plan, the
Board must first identify beneficial uses to be protected. (fee 
Nat. Code	 13050(j )(1).) For the purposes of this example, we
will focus on the broad range of instream environmental
beneficial uses. Pursuant to its responsibilities under the
FWPCA and the P-CWQCA, the Board, after identifying the
beneficial uses to be protected, must then develop water quality
objectives to protect beneficial uses. (See Nat. Code
13050(j) (2).) The first aspect of the Board's activities
associated with the development of water quality objectives is
to determine the impacts of pollution from point sources, and
then establish effluent limitations on the discharge of those
pollutants. These effluent limitation levels must insure the
protection of public waters for, among other things, these
instream environmental uses. (See 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a).) It is
important to note that the requirements imposed on the Board,
with respect to these pollutants, are absolute. The goal is the
total elimination of pollution from point sources, nothing less.
(See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).) This aspect of the Board's
-14-
activities will result in the first level of water quality
objective established by the Board.
The Board must next consider, in light of the point source
pollutant objectives, whether additional objectives are
necessary to protect beneficial uses. These additional
objectives are secondary and supplement the point source
discharge objectives. (See 33 U.S.C. § 1313; see also 182
Cal.App.3d 108.) For the purposes of this example, we will
assume that further protection is needed.4
In establishing this supplemental protection, the Board is
constrained and must limit objectives for this purpose to "the
highest water quality which is reasonable considering all
demands being made and to be made on those waters and the total
values involved ...." (Wat. Code § 13000.) The objectives
cannot be established without regard to the impact that those
objectives will have on other beneficial uses.
The Legislature has provided the Board with directions on
how this determination is to be made. The operative term used
within the P-CWQCA is that the secondary objectives must be
"reasonable." The term "reasonable" was borrowed from the water
rights field, but is applied in a slightly different manner in
the water quality context.
In the water rights context, the term "reasonable" is
viewed in various ways. One only has a right to the reasonable
4	 It is important to note, however, that the additional protection must
be necessary to safeguard against other than point sources of pollution,
such as salinity intrusion. It is never appropriate to protect against
point source discharges of pollutants except through control at the source.
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beneficial use of water. If a use of water is not reasonable or
beneficial, then no right to that use exists. The determination
of reasonableness depends upon the facts and circumstances in a
given situation.
The question of reasonable use in water rights is most
often viewed from the perspective of whether a given exercise of
an existing right is reasonable in light of the impacts upon
others who have or would like to have a water right. In this
situation the use and method of use of the competing water
rights are viewed and a determination made based upon this
limited analysis.
The question of reasonableness, in water rights, can also
be viewed in a larger context. The use of water for agriculture
is by statute a beneficial use of water. The use or method of
use of that water, in a given situation, may, however, be
determined to be unreasonable. Flood irrigation, for example,
may be a perfectly reasonable method of diversion in the
northeastern counties of the state, while it may be
unreasonable, in certain circumstances, in the San Joaquin
Valley. This use of the term "reasonable" is still a very
focused view of the water use question, but a broader view than
was used in the first example.
In contrast to the two examples above, the use and meaning
of the term "reasonable" in the water quality context is very
broad. First, one is no longer interested in the individual's
use of water, i.e., the use of water by flood irrigation for
agriculture versus the use of water by sprinklers for
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agriculture. Rather, the focus is on the collective use of
water, i.e., the use of water for agriculture versus the use of
water for some other purpose. Second, the reasonableness of the
collective use of water for any one purpose is viewed not only
against the needs of water for other collective uses, but also
against the relative value of the use to society as a whole.
While the public interest has an important role in the water
rights context, it is the primary focus in the water quality
field. Finally, the focus of the inquiry, while heavily based
upon an investigation of the uses of water, is to establish an
objective to protect a use. In this final context, an objective
can be reasonable even though it does not fully protect a use.
In arriving at supplemental objectives, the Board must,
therefore, make sure that its objectives are reasonable. Let
us, for the purposes of this example, consider objectives that
would require outflow, in addition to what is required pursuant
to D-1485, in the range of 6,000,000 acre feet annually. The
broad effect of meeting these flows on other beneficial uses of
Delta water would need to be evaluated before these objectives
could be adopted. This analysis, however, is not the specific
farm-by-farm, city-by-city analysis that would be required in
the water rights context.
The Board must first look at the competing uses of water
and determine if they are reasonable. Again, this view is not
the limited view of reasonableness that is undertaken in the
water rights context, but rather is a determination of the
collective reasonableness of the use. The Board must then look
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at the effect meeting the objectives will have on the competing
uses of water. This analysis looks to the total environmental,
social and economic effects that meeting the objectives will
have on local areas, the state, the nation and internationally.
(See Wat. Code §§ 13000, 13142, 13145 and 13241.)
Returning to the example, the Board would look at the
outflow required to meet the objective and determine its effect
(to choose one of the more beneficial uses that must be
considered) on municipal uses of water. Assuming meeting the
objective would result in a reduction of water available for
municipal use, the Board would then have to determine what that
reduction will mean in real terms. That is, will the reduction
in water for this purpose cause a shortage of drinking water, a
redistribution or reduction in populations, an economic downturn
in the state economy, and will this have consequent effects
outside the state? Assuming it will (and in the example, there
is no question that the flows would have grave impacts on all
other beneficial uses), the Board will need to balance those
factors against the consequences of developing a reduced
objective to protect the instream beneficial uses. The
consequences are again viewed from the broad perspective,
considering local, state, national and international impacts.
Once the supplemental objectives are developed, the Board
must establish a Program of Implementation. (Wat. Code
§ 13050(j) (3).) The Program of Implementation describes the
means by which the objectives are to be met. In the context of
the primary pollution related objectives, this must be through
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source control. However, in the case of the supplemental
objectives, the means by which objectives are met are varied,
and, indeed, there is no requirement that they actually be met
if the most reasonable (as opposed to the easiest) means for
doing so are not within the Board's power. Among the ways that
the objectives can be met are through adjustment to water
rights, the construction of physical facilities and other types
of non-flow related options which may be achieved through
agreements between affected parties.
The result of all of the above should be a Water Quality
Control Plan which protects all beneficial uses without
destroying the economic and social structure of California.
III. Fe0era1 Preemption
As the Board analyzes the testimony and evidence introduced
during the Phase I hearings, it must recognize the limitations
on its actions imposed by preemptive federal law. As noted
above, for example, the FWPCA, to a certain degree, constrains
the State's ability to act generally in the area of water
quality control.
Other congressional actions also must be considered. Chief
among these are the various authorizing and related statutory
provisions dealing with the CVP. The CVPWA recognizes that in
most respects it is premature for the Board to deal with
specific questions related to preemption, since, until
objectives are established, it likely will be impossible to
determine whether the Board's action is inconsistent with
-19-
congressional authorizations. The most logical times for this
issue to be fully addressed are during the Phase II and
Phase III hearing processes.
It may, however, be appropriate to at least consider this
issue at various points throughout the process, including at the
time that the draft Water Quality Control Plan objectives are
developed. In this context, the Board should consider, to the
extent that the evidence already presented allows:
1. Evidence which demonstrates how the CVP operates to
meet its authorized purposes;
2. Evidence of what is required to meet the objectives to
be imposed in the plan;
3. Evidence which demonstrates the effect, if any, that
the plan objectives will have on the operation of the CVP to
meet its authorized purposes.
As will be described below, the CVPWA does not believe that
the law or facts in this case support an increase in Delta
outflow over that required in D-1485 for the reasonable
protection of beneficial uses in the Bay-Delta. However, and to
the extent that the Board considers such increased flows,
evidence has been introduced, and can be reviewed by the Board,
to demonstrate generally the impact that increased Delta outflow
will have on the following:
A.	 Central Valley Project Yield:
An increase in Delta outflow requirements will decrease
project yield.
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B. Agricultural Water Service:
Reduction in project yield may result in a reduction of
water service to specific acreage within the congressionally
authorized CVP service area.
C. Municijal Water Service:
Reduction in project yield may result in a reduction of
water service to municipal and industrial customers within the
congressionally authorized CVP service area.
D. Power:
The change in CVP operation which may be caused by meeting
objectives which require more Delta outflow than required under
D-1485 will result in a loss of dependable capacity.
E. Groundwater:
A reduction in CVP water available within the authorized
CVP agricultural service area will result in an increase of use
of already overdrafted groundwater basins in the San Joaquin
Valley.
R.	 Recreation. Fish an. Wildlife:
An increase in Delta outflow, over that required by D-1485
could result in lower levels in CVP reservoirs, diminishing the
current recreational values of those reservoirs. Increased
Delta outflow, over that required by D-1485, could result in
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less flows available for fish and wildlife protection in the
upstream and export areas.
G. Economic and Social:
A reduction in CVP water availability within the
congressionally authorized CVP service area could have a
significant adverse effect upon the people who live in those
areas and in other areas of the state.
H. Central valley Project Revenue Loss:
Loss of CVP yield that would be caused by meeting
objectives above those contained in D-1485 would result in a
loss of water service contract revenues and power revenues.
As noted above, not all of these considerations, as they
relate to the CVP and the question of federal preemption, can be
dealt with during the current phase of the Board's work.
However, the issues outlined above must be analyzed by the Board
in the context of its development of objectives to provide a
reasonable level of protection to Bay-Delta beneficial uses.
Iv. EialLandnaitesadinatianst
In developing the program for implementation, which is an
integral part of the water quality control plan, the Board
should consider the provisions of the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 661 et seq.). That Act requires
any department or agency of the United States, or any public or
private agency under federal permit or license, to consult with
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the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter
"USFWS"), and, in California, the Department of Fish and Game
(hereinafter "DF&G"), prior to the construction of water-related
facilities. The purpose of this consultation is to insure that
the facilities are examined and constructed with an eye toward
preventing the loss of fish and wildlife resources. (See 16
U.S.C.	 662(a).) The Act further provides that reports and
recommendations of the Secretary of Interior on how possible
harm or damage to the wildlife resources can be avoided or
mitigated shall become an integral part of the feasibility
documents prepared for the water project, and that they must be
submitted to Congress along with the other feasibility studies.
(See 16 U.S.C. § 662(b).) The Act also provides that water and
land developed through these projects be made available,
consistent with the primary purpose of the project, for fish and
wildlife purposes. (See 16 U.S.C.	 663.)
A cost benefit analysis of the wildlife features of the
project goes to Congress. (See 16 U.S.C. 	 662(f).) The
additional costs for the construction or installation and
maintenance of wildlife conservation measures is to become an
integral part of project costs. (16 U.S.C. § 662(d).) The
provisions of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act apply to
those projects which were less than sixty percent completed at
the time of the enactment of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act. (16 U.S.C. 662(g).) Date of enactment for the purposes
of the relevant limitations was probably August 12, 1958. (See 
Historical Note, West's U.S. Codes Ann., § 662, p. 459.) With
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respect to projects that were authorized but not yet constructed
at the time the Act was enacted, Congress provided for the
modification of those projects to account for the wildlife
resource considerations. 	 (See 16 U.S.C.	 662(c).)
The CVP has undergone review, pursuant to the extensive
provisions of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act. In
developing its Program of Implementation, the SWRCB should
remember that the many various fish hatcheries, wildlife
refuges, and fishery releases were constituted, developed, and
are being made as mitigation measures for CVP construction and
operation, pursuant to congressionally defined obligations. The
Board should give legal and policy consideration to the
appropriateness of second-guessing, in the context of the
instant process, requirements imposed by Congress on its own
project.
V.	 Public Law No. 99-546
In developing its draft Water Quality control Plan, the
Board must consider the provisions of Public Law No. 99-546,
October 27, 1986, which, among other things, authorized the
United States to execute (1) the "Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Department of Water Resources of the
State of California for the Coordinated Operation of the Central
Valley Project and the State Water Project" (hereinafter "COA")
and (2) the Suisun Marsh Preservation Agreement.
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A.	 The COA
Title I of Public Law No. 99-546 deals with the COA. The
relevant sections of Public Law No. 99-546, for the Board's
current inquiry, are Sections 101 and 104.
1.	 Section 101 - Project Opeo:fition 
Section 101 amends section 2 of the Act of August 26, 1937
by the addition of language which authorizes and directs the
Secretary of the Interior to operate the CVP, in conjunction
with the SWP, in conformity with state water quality control
standards for the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
and Estuary so long as the Secretary determines that those
standards are consistent with congressional directives
applicable to the Clip.
(a) Federal Preemption
In California v. United States (1978) 438 U.S. 645, the
United States Supreme Court stated that the SWRCB could impose
terms and conditions on water rights permits issued to the
United States, so long as those terms and conditions were not
inconsistent with the congressional authorization of the Clip.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, elaborating on the standard
set by the Supreme Court, stated that the proper inquiry into
the consistency of terms and conditions imposed by the SWRCB is
an inquiry into congressional intent as that term is
traditionally used. "Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act
requires only that state water law will apply unless the
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contrary is intended by Congress." United States v California 
(9th Cir. 1982) 694 F.2d 1171, 1176.
In general, a state statute or regulation is preempted by a
federal rule to the extent it conflicts with a federal statute
(Maryland V. Louisiana (1981) 451 U.S. 725, 747) or where it
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and objectives of
Congress (Perez v. Campbell (1971) 402 U.S. 637, 649 quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67). In a situation
such as potentially could exist with the CVP, an SWRCB term or
condition which clashes with expressed or clearly implied
congressional intention or which works at cross-purposes with an
important federal interest served by the congressional scheme,
is preempted. Where this happens, the state-imposed term and
condition must fall. United 5t-at-es v California, supra, 694
F.2d at p. 1177.
The language of Section 101 of the Act was derived from
this basic legal premise. Indeed, Congress expressly noted that
it was aware of relevant decisional law, as did the drafters of
the COA, including California v United States. (See H.R. Rep.
No. 99-257, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 6, 7-8; COA
Article 11(d).)
(b) In Conjunction with the State of California
Water Project 
For the most part, as noted above, it is premature to deal
with the preemption issue at this juncture. However,
Section 101 itself contains a congressional directive which the
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Board must consider as it develops the Water Quality Control
Plan. While the legislation authorizes and directs the
Secretary of Interior to operate the CVP to meet water quality
standards set by the SWRCB, assuming those standards are
consistent with congressional authorization of the CV?, it also
directs that the CVP will be so operated only "in conjunction
with the State of California Water Project." To the extent
that, and for whatever reasons, the SWP does not meet standards
imposed by the SWRCB, the CVP may not be required to meet those
standards alone. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with
congressional authorization of the CV?. Indeed, the House
Report provides that the phrase "in conjunction with the State
of California Water Project" was included to make it clear that
the responsibility to meet water quality standards is premised
on a shared effort by the federal and state projects, as
delineated in the COA. The Committee did not expect the effort
to fall entirely on one project. (H.R. Rep. No. 99-257, supra,
at p. 9.)
(c) atatf_staniluaLi.t.,y_itaacuz;ia
With regard to the consistency with federal law of water
quality standards established after the date of the
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legislation, 5 Congress intended that the nature of either
project's obligation not change from what Congress understood
those obligations to be. The House Report indicates that the
obligation of the CVP is a shared responsibility with the SWP
and that it is the respective obligation of each of the projects
to maintain state water quality standards pursuant to the
methodology established to develop the sharing formula found in
Article 6 of the COA. The House Report then provides that the
technical methodology from which Article 6 was derived is found
in a document entitled "Technical Report and Determination of
Annual Water Supply for Central Valley Project and State Water
Project" dated March 1984. (H.R. Rep. No. 99-257, zupr4, at
pp. 10-11.) In that technical document it is clear that the
obligations that are being dealt with by the state and federal
projects in the development of the COA are mitigation
obliaations; that is, the projects are to mitigate any damage to
the Bay-Delta due to their operations and no more. So long as
the SWRCB imposes mitigation requirements on the projects, no
preemption problem necessarily arises. However, any attempt by
the Board to impose enhancement criteria on the projects for the
5	 The D-l485 proceedings, as well as the earlier proceedings on water
quality, were confined to the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Suisun Marsh and
Estuary. Congress, however, anticipated that the SWRCB, in its continuing
endeavor to set water quality standards, would expand its regulations to
San Francisco Bay. While the COA does not address Bay standards, the
authorizing legislation authorizes and directs the Secretary of Interior to
meet state water quality standards for the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-
San Joaquin Delta and Estuary. The inclusion of San Francisco Bay in the
authorization was intentional and if standards for the Bay are established,
they must be met, assuming, of course, that they are reasonably imposed,
consistent with the congressional directives respecting the CVP, and they





Bay-Delta clearly would run at cross purposes with the COA
endorsed and authorized by Congress in Public Law No. 99-546.
2.	 Contra Costa Canal 
The provisions of Public Law No. 99-546 dealing with the
Contra Costa Canal are not found in the COA except to the extent
that the COA [Exhibit A] cross-references the water quality
standards imposed by the SWRCB in water rights Decision 1485 for
the Contra Costa Canal intake. This section of Public Law
No. 99-546 provides that the CVP, in conjunction with the SWP,
is to be operated so that water supplies at the intake of the
Contra Costa Canal are of a quality equal to the water quality
standards contained in D-1485, except under specifiedC
	
	
conditions. The stated intent of this section of Public Law
No. 99-546 is to insure that the quality of water at the intake
of the Contra Costa Canal is of a quality equal to or better
than the municipal and industrial water quality standards
contained in SWRCB Decision 1485. (H.R. Rep. No. 99-257, supra,
at p. 10.)
This provision of Public Law No. 99-546 is qualified in
three significant ways. First, the obligation must be met in
conjunction with the SW!'. To the extent that the SWP does not
operate to meet the objectives, the CVP need not and, indeed,
cannot meet the objectives. Second, if the Secretary of
Interior at any time determines that meeting the standards is
inconsistent with the congressional authorization of ther
project, then the standards need not be met. If it were
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determined, based upon the facts and circumstances that might
exist at a given time, that meeting the standards would be
unreasonable, then meeting those standards would also be
inconsistent with congressional authorization. Third, the
standards need not be met in situations where a drought
emergency is declared by the Governor of California.
D-1485 contains objectives for the Contra Costa Canal which
include, in addition to the year-around 250 mg/1 requirement for
domestic purposes, a 150 mg/1 chloride requirement for
industrial purposes. Specific to the instant discussion is the
question of whether Public Law No. 99-546 obligates the Board to
set objectives at the Contra Costa Canal equal to or better than
those established in D-1485. The answer to that question is no.
As described elsewhere, the CVPWA believes that the
150 mg/1 objective should be eliminated as part of the Water
Quality Control Plan. It is simply unreasonable to provide
freshwater outflow for that purpose when the same end can be
achieved in a less expensive, more efficient manner through
physical facilities. A determination that that is, in fact, the
case would mandate the elimination of the objective. If the
objective is eliminated, the SWP would not have to meet the
objective and, as a consequence, neither would the CVP, since
the CVP need only meet objectives "in conjunction with the SWP."
Moreover, meeting objectives that were deemed unreasonable by
the Board would also be inconsistent with the CVP authorization.
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3.	 Section 104
Section 104 of Public Law No. 99-546 provides that the
Secretary of Interior may not contract for delivery of more than
75 percent of the firm annual yield from the CVP until one year
after the Secretary has transmitted to Congress a feasibility
report and recommendations for a refuge water supply within the
Central Valley Basin, California. The Senate Report indicates
that the purpose for this provision was to address concerns by
fish and wildlife interests that, with authorization and
implementation of the COA, all available water supplies would be
subject to long-term contracts, without consideration of refuge
needs. The Senate Report specifically notes that the purpose of
the amendment was not to reserve water for refuge needs in the
sense of creating a legal reservation. Rather, the purpose of
the provision was to solely insure that, should the Secretary
recommend that additional water be utilized for fish and
wildlife refuge purposes, the available water supply would not
have been previously committed to CVP contractual, consumptive
needs. (.aaa Sen. Rep. No. 99-256, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at pp. 5096, 5104.) Suggestions
by parties during the hearings that there was a reservation of
water to be used for refuges are incorrect.
B.	 Suisun Mars4
Public Law No. 99-546 requires the CVP to operate in
compliance with existing water quality standards or any future
water quality standards established by the SWRCB so long as
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those standards are not inconsistent with congressional
directives applicable to the project. As a consequence,
Congress recognized that, upon enactment of Public Law
No. 99-546, the CVP would be operated in compliance with water
quality standards that were set forth in Exhibit A of the COA.
The final legislation which comprises Public Law No. 99-546
includes within it authorization for the United States to
execute the Suisun Marsh Preservation Agreement. Execution of
that agreement shifts the Suisun Marsh obligation from the
D-1485/COA forum into a separate and distinct area governed by
the Suisun Marsh Preservation Agreement and Title II of Public
Law No. 99-546.6
Title II of Public Law No. 99-546, which authorized the
Suisun Marsh Preservation Agreement (hereinafter "SMPA") was
intended to address fully the water quality needs of Suisun
Marsh. Congress recognized that without the SMPA and the
construction of facilities authorized in Pub.L. No. 99-546,
existing D-1485 standards might require extensive releases of
6	 The enactment of Title II of Public Law No. 99-546 in most respects
makes prior state and federal statements on the Marsh irrelevant. It is
worth noting, however, that Congress specifically recognized that the so-
called D-1485 permanent Suisun Marsh water quality objectives were never
included within the Exhibit A objectives with which it authorized the USER
to comply. Rather, Congress, in authorizing the USER to meet water quality
standards related to the Marsh, only authorized the USER to meet the
interim Marsh standards included within Exhibit A to the COA. Indeed, the
House Report makes it clear that Congress did not intend for Public Law
No. 99-546 to impose the permanent Suisun Marsh standards on the CVP.
(H.R. No. 99-257, supra, at p. 8.) The House Report, of course,
accompanies H.R. 3113 which did not include Title II. As a consequence,
the House Report does not discuss the SMPA.
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SWP and CVP water which, in the case of the CV?, would reduce,
unreasonably, CVP yield.
D-1485 itself recognizes this fact, and it is within that
decision that the rationale for dealing with water quality
objectives for Suisun Marsh, through physical facilities,
originates. In D-1485, the Board found that "[f]ull protection
of Suisun Marsh now could be accomplished only by requiring up
to 2 million acre-feet of freshwater outflow in dry and critical
years in addition to that required to meet other standards."
(D-1485 at p. 14.) The Board concluded that "[t]his requirement
would result in a one-third reduction in combined firm
exportable yield of State and federal Projects." (Tbid.) As a
result (and due to the 1976-77 drought experience) the Board
noted that in spite of the requirement of "full protection" for
the Marsh:
"This decision [i.e., D-1485] balances the limitations
of available water supplies against the mitigation
responsibility of the projects. This balance is based
upon the constitutional mandate ... 'that the water
resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the
fullest extent of which they are capable ...' and that
unreasonable use and unreasonable diversion be
prevented (Article 10, Section 2, California
Constitution)."	 (D-1485 at p. 14.)
The Board could have added, as authority for its ultimate
decision, the provision of Water Code section 13000 which limits
the Board's obligation to establish water quality objectives to
the highest water quality reasonably attainable. Objectives set
so high as to result in a one-third reduction in the combined
firm yield of the SWP and CVP is gei 11 unreasonable, and does
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not equate to the definition of "full protection" implied in the
P-CWQCA or in the applicable case law.
In order to provide the proper level of protection, in
light of other uses of the water involved, the Board imposed
interim objectives until such time as identified parties could
develop alternative water supplies through the construction of
physical facilities for the Marsh. The Board noted that "[s]uch
alternative supplies appear to represent a feasible and
reasonable method for protection of the Marsh and mitigation of
the adverse impacts of the projects." (D-1485 at p. 14.)
The SMPA was developed in direct response to D-1485 and to
provide "full protection" to the Marsh. (5ee SMPA, Recitals
(a), (c)-(f).) As noted above, Congress, in authorizing the
execution of the Agreement believed and intended that it meet
the United States Marsh obligations. For example, Congressman
Fazio, the Representative within whose district the Marsh lies,
indicated that the SMPA was important because it provided for
the construction of the physical facilities necessary to protect
the Marsh. (Zee 131 Cong. Rec. H7304 (daily ed. September 9,
1985) (Statement of Rep. Fazio).) The Senate Report provides:
"Absent the agreement and construction of the
facilities, achievement of water quality standards
could require the release of up to 2 million acre-feet
of water (1.2 million acre-feet from the CVP) during
dry years. Such releases would reduce the additional
CVP yield made available by the COA by at least
750,000 acre feet. To fully address the water quality
needs of the Delta and Suisun Marsh requires
implementation of both the COA and the Suisun Marsh
Preservation Agreement." (Sen. Rep. No. 99-256,
snpra, at p. 7, emphasis added.)
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Accordingly, the SMPA and its authorizing legislation preclude
any action by the Board to impose obligations on the CVP greater
than those created by the SMPA.
VI Endangered Species
A.	 The Federal Endangered Species Act 
From time to time throughout the Phase I hearings reference
has been made to the Board's alleged obligations under the
Federal Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "FESA") (16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531 et seq.). As a matter of law, the Board has no
obligation under the FESA, other than to avoid acts prohibited
by Section 9 of that Act (16 U.S.C. § 1538).7
In enacting the FESA, Congress determined that "all Federal
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered
species and threatened species and shall utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purpose of this chapter." (16
U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1).)	 Section 7 of the FESA (16 U.S.C.	 1536)
requires all federal agencies to consult with the Secretary 8 to
insure that federal actions are "not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
7	 Section 9 of the FESA prohibits certain actions. The SWRCB's actions
in the instant case, the establishment of water quality objectives, is not
and, indeed, by definition, cannot be the type of activity prohibited by
the Act. (Sas 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1)-(2).) This does not mean that the
operation of water facilities cannot come under the prohibition of
Section 9. That, however, is a question distinct from the issue here.
8	 The term "Secretary" means the Secretary of Interior or Secretary of
Commerce, depending upon the species involved. (16 U.S.C. § 1532(15).)
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species ... unless such agency has been granted an exemption for
such action ...."	 (16 U.S.C.	 1536(a)(2); see Fish and Game
Code 9, 2095.) The FESA is directed, in the first instance,
toward the actions of federal departments or agencies, and the
consultation requirements of the Act are solely directed toward
those departments and agencies. There are no provisions within
the FESA requiring state consultation with the Secretary.
Except as provided in certain sections of the Act related
to funding and critical habitat questions (see, e.g., 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531(a)(5), (c)(2), 1536(a)(2) and 1542(c)), the state role,
as it involves the FESA, is limited to the provisions of
Section 6 of that Act (16 U.S.C.	 1535). The provisions of
Section 6 are limited and have no application to the instant
proceedings.
Section 6 of the FESA provides that the Secretary, in
carrying out its responsibilities under the Act, will cooperate
"to the maximum extent practicable" with the State. (16 U.S.C.
§ 1535(a).) That cooperation shall include consultation with
the states concerned before acquiring any land or water, or
interest therein, for the purpose of conserving endangered
species.	 (Ibid.)
Section 6 also provides that the Secretary may enter into
management and other cooperative agreements with the states.
(16 U.S.C.	 1535(b), (c).) These agreements, in essence, are
intended to allow the federal agencies to assist with the
implementation of state programs, and provide for the allocation
of funds for this purpose.	 (16 U.S.C.	 1535(d).) Actions
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taken by the Secretary under these agreements must be reviewed
at least once a year.	 (16 U.S.C. § 1535(e).)
Section 6 clearly preempts any state law with respect to
importation or exportation of, or interstate or freight commerce
in, endangered species or threatened species, although it does
not void any state law which is at least consistent with or more
stringent than the provisions of the FESA. (16 U.S.C.
§ 1535(f).) Finally, Section 6 allows some relaxation of the
prohibitions found at 16 United States Code sections 1533(d) and
1538(a) (1) (B) within a state that is a part to a cooperative
agreement pursuant to 16 United States Code section 1535(c).
(16 U.S.C.	 1535(g).)
In reality, the only provision of the FESA which has any
relevance to the instant case is found in Section 2 of the Act.
(16 U.S.C.	 1531.) There Congress declared that it was
Congress' policy that "Federal agencies shall cooperate with
State and local agencies to resolve water resource issues in
concert with conservation of endangered species." (16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(c) (2).) This finding was a recognition of state primacy
in the area of water resources planning, as well as a
recognition of the unique role that water plays in the socio-
economic health of communities in the West.
B. IheSalifsunia_EnclansaresL).5vaQiea_ilat
The SWRCB must comply with the provisions of the California
Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "CESA"), Fish and Game Code
sections 2050 et seq. However, if the Board fulfills its
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obligations under the P-CWQCA, including its Phase II obligation
to prepare an Environmental Impact Report (hereinafter "EIR"),
it will have, by necessity, also fulfilled its obligation under
the CESA.
Fish and Game Code sections 2051 through 2055 provide that
it is State policy to conserve, protect, resolve and enhance
endangered species and threatened species, and their habitat,
because of their ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, aesthetic, economic and scientific value to the
people of California; and that all state agencies, boards and
commissions must join in this effort.
While these sections provide that it is State policy to
conserve endangered and threatened species, this policy is
tempered with a requirement that it be imposed in a "reasonable"
fashion. For example, while the CESA would require the
development of "reasonable and prudent alternatives" to a
project 9 which would jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered or threatened species, it allows individual projects
to proceed if "economic, social or other conditions make
infeasible such [reasonable and prudent] alternatives ... [so
long as] appropriate mitigation and enhancement measures are
provided." (Fish & G. Code '5 2054; see Fish & G. Code § 2053.10
9	 The term "project" means a project as defined in the California
Environmental Quality Act (hereinafter "CEQA"). (Pub. Resources Code
§§ 21000 et seq., Fish & G. Code 	 2064.)
10	 "The Legislature further finds and declares that it is
the policy of the state that state agencies should not approve
projects as proposed which would jeopardize the continued
Footnote continued on next page.
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This is identical to the Board's obligation under the P-CWQCA to
develop water quality objectives which will attain the highest
water quality which is reasonable to protect beneficial uses.
(gee Nat. Code .5 13000.) Among the beneficial uses that are
listed in the P-CWQCA are the preservation and enhancement of
fish, wildlife and other aquatic resources or preserves, which
would include endangered and threatened species, and their
associated habitat. (See Nat. Code § 13050(f).)
The substantive application of the CESA is somewhat
different than the application of the FESA. The CESA is closely
tied to the provisions of the California Environmental Quality
Act (hereinafter "CEQA"), Public Resources Code sections 21000
et seq., and compliance with CEQA further insures the Board's
compliance with the CESA. Since compliance with CEQA is an
integral part of the P-CWQCA process, there simply is no way
that the Board, in acting pursuant to the P-CWQCA, can violate
existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat
essential to the continued existence of those species, jf there
are reasonable and prudent alternatives available consistent 
with conserving the Fineries or its habitat which would prevent 
leonardy
"Furthermore, it is the policy of this state and the
intent of the Legislature that reasonable and prudent 
a l ternatives shall he developed x the depa rtment. together
with the project proponent and the state lead agency 
ron cligtent with conserving the apenies. while at the same time
H .	 •	 • - • • -
poasibie 
	
(Fish	 G. Code	 2053, emphasis added.)
"The Legislature further fi nds and declares that in the
aporoved if aporopriate mitigation and enhancement measures are
provided " (Fish	 G. Code § 2054, emphasis added.)
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the provisions of CESA. Moreover, and significant to the
instant process, substantive compliance with the CESA is a
Phase II matter, not a Phase I matter, although CESA issues must
be considered as part of Phase I.
The CESA defines the term "state lead agency" as the state
agency, board, or commission which is a lead agency under CEQA.
(Fish & G. Code § 2065.) In the instant case, the SWRCB is
clearly the state lead agency for this "project," which is
defined under CEQA as the final water quality control plan.
(See Fish & G. Code § 2064 and Pub. Resources Code § 21065.)
The state lead agency must consult with the DF&G in the
development of the water quality control plan. (Pub. Resources
Code	 21104.2.) During that consultation (which will take
place during Phase II), the DF&G shall issue a written finding
regarding "jeopardy.	 This finding also must include the
DF&G's determination of whether a proposed project will result
in any "taking" 12 of endangered or threatened species. (Fish &
G. Code	 2090.) If jeopardy is found, the DF&G must determine
and specify to the state lead agency "reasonable and prudent
alternatives" consistent with conserving the species which would
prevent jeopardy.	 (Fish & G. Code '5 2091.)
11	 The term "jeopardy" means that a proposed project would jeopardize
the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or
result in the destruction of essential habitat	 (age Fish & G. Code
§ 2090.)
12	 As noted above, in the discussion of the FESA, the Board's action
with respect to the development of a water quality control plan cannot
result in a taking.
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Significant to the instant process, Fish and Game Code
section 2092 provides a specific mechanism for applying the
reasonable and prudent alternative criteria, assuming a finding
of jeopardy. Fish and Game Code section 2092 reads as follows:
"(a) Notwithstanding Section 21081 of the Public
Resources Code, if, after consulting with the
department pursuant to Section 2090, jeopardy is
found, the state lead agency shall require reasonable
and prudent alternatives consistent with conserving
the species which would prevent jeopardy.
"(b) If specific economic, social, or other
conditions make infeasible the alternatives prescribed
in subdivision (a), except as provided in
subdivision (c), the state lead agency may approve a
project when jeopardy is found, if both of the
following conditions are met:
"(1) The state lead agency requires reasonable
mitigation and enhancement measures as are necessary
and appropriate to minimize the adverse impacts of the
project upon the endangered species or threatened
species, or habitat essential to the continued
existence of the species, including, but not limited
to, live propagation, transplantation, and habitat
acquisition, restoration, and improvement.
"(2) The state lead agency finds all of the
following:
"(A) The benefits of the project as proposed
clearly outweigh the benefits of the project were it
to be carried out with the reasonable and prudent
alternatives consistent with conserving the species
which would prevent jeopardy.
"(B) An irreversible or irretrievable commitment
made after initiation of consultation required
pursuant to Section 2090, of resources to the project,
which has the effect of foreclosing the opportunity
for formulating and implementing reasonable and
prudent alternatives consistent with conserving the
species which prevent jeopardy, has not been made.
"(c) A state lead agency shall not approve a
project which would likely result in the extinction of
any endangered species or threatened species. The
state lead agency shall base its determination on the
best existing scientific information."
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As stated above, this is the type of determination that must be
made to properly protect fish and wildlife beneficial uses,
including endangered species, under P-CWQCA.
At this phase of the proceedings, however, the only
provision of the CESA that is relevant procedurally is the
provision of Fish and Game Code section 2093. This provision
allows for early consultation. Under the circumstances that
exist in the instant process, the DF&G presentations during the
Phase I hearings should constitute this early consultation.13
It is now up to the Board to consider the DF&G comments in order
to develop objectives that will provide the highest reasonable
water quality considering all demands being made and to be made
of those waters and the total values involved.
VII. The Pullin Trust Doctrine 
The Public Trust Doctrine has little, if any, application
to the Phase I considerations of the Board. While the public
trust does identify beneficial uses that must be considered and
protected by the Board in the development of the water quality
control plan, its main importance, from the Board's perspective,
is as a significant limitation on water rights. As Rcicangial
noted, "the state's navigable waters are subject to a public
13	 The Board should be aware that the CDFSG's participation in this
process as a party may affect its ability to act as a neutral scientific
agency as is required under the CESA. Moreover, the Board must be careful
in accepting any DF&G overture toward additional "consultation" to avoid ez
parte and other improper contacts. The actions of the State of California
are subject to the fundamental constraints imposed by the "due process"
requirements of the United States Constitution.
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trust and that the state, as trustee, has a duty to preserve
this trust property from harmful diversions by water rights
holders." (182 Cal.App.3d at p. 106.) The doctrine provides a
significant enforcement tool should the Board determine it is
necessary to reallocate water to protect trust purposes. 14 (Id.
at pp. 149-152.)
In Marks v Whitney (1971) 6 Ca1.3d 251, the California
Supreme Court stated that the public trust is intended to
protect navigation, fisheries and commerce (the traditional
trust purpose), as well as the "right to fish, hunt, bathe,
swim, to use for boating and general recreation purposes the
navigable waters of the state and to use the bottom of the
navigable waters for anchoring, standing and other purposes."
(6 Ca1.3d at p. 259.) The California Supreme Court's subsequent
decision in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33
Ca1.3d 419, 437, established and confirmed that the trust
extended to protect "navigable waters from harm caused by
diversions ...."	 (Id. at p. 437.)
The duty to protect public trust uses of water is no
different from the duty to protect beneficial uses pursuant to
the P-CWQCA. Indeed, the term "beneficial uses" is defined in
the P-CWQCA to include "recreation; aesthetic enjoyment;
navigation; and preservation and enhancement of fish, wildlife,
and other aquatic resources and preserves." (Wat. Code
14	 While the trust's existence cannot be questioned, the proper method
for its application to any particular water rights has not yet been
determined. The application of the doctrine may constitute a taking under
the United States Constitution.
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§ 13050(f).) Moreover, the determination of the level of
protection to be afforded public trust uses is identical to the
determination of the level of protection that is to be afforded
beneficial uses under the P-CWQCA. In both situations, the
level of protection is "the highest water quality which is
reasonable, considering all demands being made and to be made on
those waters and the total values involved ....” (Wat. Code
13000.)
In Audubon the Supreme Court reached the following
conclusions with respect to how this level of protection was to
be determined. These conclusions included: (1) the realization
that the appropriation of water for non-trust uses may
unavoidably harm the trust uses, but that this harm is justified
when one considers that the population and economy of the state
depend upon the appropriation of vast quantities of waters for
uses unrelated to instream trust values (33 Cal.App.3d, supra,
at p. 446); (2) the realization that "[t]he state has an
affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the
planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect
public trust uses whenever feasible ...." (Tbid., emphasis
added. See generally 33 Ca1.3d, supra, at pp. 445-448.)
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